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THE ideal charitable gift clearly expresses the donor's intention, yet is
flexible enough to be accommodated to later radical changes in the circum-
stances surrounding the gift. But all too often these gifts are impulsively
conceived, indefinitely expressed and planned with lamentable shortsighted-
ness.' In such instances a court may be forced to balance frequently antag-
onistic considerations: to protect the social benefits derived from charitable
endowments,2 to evaluate interests of contesting heirs and residuary legatees 3
and, finally, to effectuate the donor's intention. When the problem of con-
struing charitable gifts first arose in American courts, the English doctrine
of cy pres4 was evoked as the most systematic means of dealing with it.
Unfortunately, however, the antiquity of that doctrine has made it an un-
wieldy tool, with the result that the American law of cy pres has become
complex and contradictory. 5
The confusion surrounding the use of the doctrine results, in part, from
the manner of its application in England, where the courts recognize and
maintain two categories of cy pres: judicial and prerogative.0 Since the origin
and early development of the doctrine have been obscured by the years, it
is impossible to establish with certainty the cause for this division;T only the
broad outline of the development of English law sheds any light on the situa-
tion. Modem equity jurisdiction originally stemmed'from the king's pre-
rogative power to insure justice to his subjects.8 All jurisdiction over charities
1. See Stinson, Modern Charitable Trusts and the Law (1932) 17 ST. Louis L.
REv. 307.
2. By the charity of individuals many public needs are satisfied which otherwise
would require governmental support with consequent stress on general tatation. See
ZOLLMAN , A.ruERicA.N LAw or CHa.Rrrms (1924) § 184.
3. Since charitable bequests are a source of disappointment to the donor's heirs or
residuary legatees whose anticipated inheritance is thereby diminished, it is common to
find judicial attempts by these disappointed descendants to defeat such gifts. Sce Stin-
son, loc. cit. supra note 1.
4. The words are a contraction of the Norman French phrase "cy pres comme
possible." The doctrine is a device with which courts attempt to prevent failure of chari-
table gifts. The original phrase contemplates an application "as near as possible" to that
specified by the donor. See BoGET, THE Law oF TRUSTS AND TRYrsTEES (1935) § 431;
ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) §399.
5. The pitfalls of the doctrine have so confused many courts that they have proved
faithless to the axiom that charities are favorites of the law. See Russell v. Allen, 107
U. S. 163, 167 (1882) ; Stinson, supra note 1, at 307; (1939) -5 VA. L. REv. 351.
6. 1foggridge v. Thackivell, 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (CI. 1803); In re Pynae,
[1903] 1 Ch. 83; In re Smith, [1932] 1 Ch. 153.
7. It was during the fifteenth century that the doctrine apparently first developed
in England, but lack of adequate source material forestalls accurate description of this
growth. See Scorr, op. cit. supra note 4, at §3482; Tuwn, LAw oF CHniATmEs AMD
MoRMAix (4th ed. 1906) 3.
S. STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE (14th ed. 1913) §38 et seq.
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was also originally derived from the king, who, by virtue of his protective
prerogative as parens patria, was deemed the constitutional trustee of all gifts
devoted to the public.9 These powers were, for the most part, gradually taken
over by the king's council, thence delegated to the chancellor alone.", They
finally became the seeds of the inherent jurisdiction of chancery which, by
the time of its greatest growth under Cardinal Woolsey, had come to en-
compass most of the prerogative powers over charities and most of the appli-
cations of cy pres.11 In two general situations, however, cy pres could still
be exercised only by the crown, namely, where a gift was void for being
devoted to a purpose illegal or contrary to public policy, or where a gift was
made to charity generally.12
The reason why power over the disposition of gifts for illegal purposes was
retained by the crown instead of falling within general equity powers appears
to rest on the fact that, during the development of the cy pres doctrine in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, gifts most commonly declared illegal
were those given to religious orders opposed to the recognized state religion."
Religious controversies were among the most important political issues of
the time, and, therefore, the disposition of gifts to illegal pious uses was a
matter of great concern to the crown. 14 But the same historical reasons do
not explain the retention by the crown of cy pres application to gifts to charity
generally. It is possible that the two types of cases were treated similarly
because of structural resemblances; when a gift to an illegal religious purpose
was declared void, there remained only the broad charitable intent which
characterizes a general gift to charity.' 5
The historical causes of the division between judicial and prerogative cy pres
being so obscure, it is not surprising that no clear line of demarcation between
the two types of cases can be found. Since the duty of applying gifts cy pres
was delegated by the king to the chancellor, as keeper of the king's con-
science,16 the chancellor served a double function: he exercised the prerogative
9. STORY, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 1583; TUDOR, op. cit. supra note 7, at 3.
10. SELDEN SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS (1896) Vol. 10, xi-xlv.
11. STORY, op. cit. supra note 8, at §§ 38-41.
12. See SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 399.1.
13. Charitable gifts during this period consisted for the most part of gifts for reli-
gious purposes, but they had not come into judicial prominence until the passage of stat-
utes suppressing monasteries and superstitious uses. See SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 4,
at § 348.2; TUDOR, op. cit. supra note 7, at 2.
14. See SCOTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 371. Where the king, like James II, was
inclined to despotism, it naturally followed that the prerogative power to dispose of funds
given to illegal religious purposes was retained and not allowed to slide into equity jur-
isdiction. See 4 CA-MPBELL, LivEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS (1874) 399.
15. Treating the judicial cy pres doctrine as a rule of construction, before application
it would be necessary to have a valid gift. Since a gift to charity generally may have
been conceptually considered void for indefiniteness, it would follow that the judicial rule
was inapplicable to such gifts.
16. STORY, op. cit. supra note 8, at §§ 38-42.
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cy pres power as a ministerial function, and as a judicial officer applied judicial
cy pres. The failure of sixteenth century reports to distinguish in which
capacity the chancellor acted in any particular case makes impossible any
definite differentiation between the two doctrines.17 Nevertheless, the English
courts did continue to recognize a distinction, with the consequence that con-
fusion mounted throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."-
Gradually there evolved in England the concept that judicial cy pres was
solely an intent-enforcing doctrine, whereby the charitable intention of the
donor might be effectuated.19 Prerogative cy pres, on the other hand, was
deemed to be purely at the discretion of the crown, without regard fur the
donor's intended purpose.20 The arbitrary manner in which prerogative
cy pres was applied can be traced largely to religious persecution. Under the
statutes suppressing superstitious uses, many gifts were held to vest im-
mediately in the king;21 and others, not specifically covered by the statutes,
were held void as contravening the public policy which the statutes expressed
and were disposed of by prerogative cy pres.Z In this situation it was in-
evitable that the donor's intention should sometimes be ignored - a course
made necessary by the legislative policy.2 3 The criticism which resulted was
17. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 432; PERRY, TuE LrX- oF Tnx:s rs A-m
TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 718; SoRY, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 1583.
18. Gifts for illegal purposes: Attorney General v. Combe. 2 CZas. Ch. 18 (Ch.
1679) (cy pres applied by court) ; Attorney General v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 248. 23 Eng. Rep.
446 (Ch. 1684) (by the crown), rcr,'d on other grornds srib. non., .\tturney General v.
Hughes, 2 Vern. 105, 23 Eng. Rep. 677 (Ch. 16S9). Gifts to charity generally: Attorney
General v. Clarke, Amb. 422, 27 Eng. Rep. 282 (1762) (by the court) ; Attorney General
v. Browne, cited in Amb. 422, 27 Eng. Rep. 282 (1749) (by the crown). Fainhre of mode
of selection: Attorney General v. Hick-man. 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 194, 22 Eng. Rep. 166 (1732)
(by the court); Attorney General v. Syderfen, 1 Vern. 224, 23 Eng. Rep. 430 (1693)
(by the crown).
19. See ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 399.1.
20. Ibid.
21. Although a superstitious use, generally defined, is one propagating a religion
not tolerated by law, the statutes vested only certain gifts in the King. See MuYL, Lw
oF CHARiTiEs (1837) Bk. 2, c. 4, §2.
22. These were called gifts to mistaken charities. See Attorney General v. Lady
Downing, Wilm. 1, 32, 97 Eng. Rep. 1, 12 (Ch. 1767) ; Cary v. Abbott, 7 Ves. 490, 495,
32 Eng. Rep. 198, 200 (Ch. 1802).
23. The example most frequently offered of this extremely arbitrary puwer is that
in which a gift left to establish a reading room to afford Jews instructik,n in their religion
was declared void as against public policy and distributed cy pres by the crown to a
foundling hospital, part of which money subsequently went tu support a Christian minis-
ter. De Costa v. De Pas, Arab. 228 27 Eng Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754). Although it is nwt
clear but that this case, the most notorious of cy pres cases, actually fell vithn the pur-
view of the statutes suppressing superstitious uses and was, therefore, nt strictly a cy
pres case, it is generally deemed a mistaken charity. See BOYLE, op. cit. sutra note 21,
at Bk. 2, c. 4, § 2; DuKEz. CHMRITABLE UsEs (1805) 479; Tur. n, op. cit. sispra nate 7,
at 6; Attorney General v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1. 34. 97 Eng. Rep. 1, 14 (Ch. 1767).
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invariably leveled at the doctrine of prerogative cy pres itself, although the
fault lay rather in the prevalence of religious persecution. 24
By the beginning of the nineteenth century this persecution had been over-
come by the Toleration Act5 and it became clear that the prerogative power
was not necessarily an arbitrary one. In 1803 Lord Eldon, in a decision that
has become a landmark of English jurisprudence, 20 attempted to define the
old distinction between judicial and prerogative cy pres. Under his rule,
where a gift is given to charity generally, without specifying definite objects
or imposing a trust, the fund is applied by prerogative cy pres. Where, on
the other hand, a trust has been expressly imposed upon such an indefinite
gift, the fund is applied by judicial cy pres, even though the designated trustee
should fail to appoint. This distinction made no effort to clarify history or
to reconcile all the precedents; i.t was laid down to establish a working basis
for the future.27 Today Eldon's test is uniformly followed by the English
courts, but distinction between prerogative and judicial cy pres is purely
vestigial, and the results under either doctrine are the same.28
Although the distinction between prerogative and judicial cy pres is no
longer of consequential importance in England, the differentiation in this
country has had, and still continues to have, far-reaching effects. The con-
fusion as to the doctrine existent at the time of its introduction to the American
courts caused great conflict not only in regard to the recognition of the doc-
trine itself, but in regard to charitable trusts. The American equity courts
had only that jurisdiction inherent in the English court of chancery.20 Amer-
ican judges were in disagreement over whether it was equity's inherent juris-
diction or the Statute of Elizabeth which gave English courts jurisdiction over
charitable trusts, authorizing them to recognize such trusts as a class distinct
from private trusts, so that the rule against perpetuities and the requirements
of definiteness of beneficiaries did not apply. The Supreme Court of the
United States unfortunately first decided that such jurisdiction stemmed only
24. See ZOLLMANN, op. cit. .rupra note 2, at § 121. Actually these allegedly arbitrary
applications were rare. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 432. Disposition of mis-
taken charities by prerogative cy pres was not always as extreme as in the De Costa
case. E.g., Isaac v. Gompertz, Dick. 170 n., 21 Eng. Rep. 234n (1792).
25. See ScoT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 371.
26. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1803), aff'd, 13 Ves.
416, 33 Eng. Rep. 350 (H. L. 1807).
27. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 83, 32 Eng. Rep. 15, 31 (Ch. 1803).
28. With the exception of the few dispositions of gifts to illegal religious purposes,
prerogative cy pres dispositions manifest as much conformance with the donor's intention
as judicial cy pres applications. See BOYLE, Op. cit. supra note 21, at 239-240; SToRY,
op. cit. supra note 8, at § 1583; In re Smith, [1932] 1 Ch. 153, 174; In re Pyne, [1903]
1 Ch. 83; it re Davis, [1902] 1 Ch. 876. The English courts sometimes imply a trust
where a direct gift has been made so that cy pres may be applied by the court and not
the crown. In re Schoales, (1930] 2 Ch. 75; Allan's Ex'r v. Allan, [1908] Sess. Cas. 807.
29. See Blackwell, The Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust (1938) 24
WASa. U. L. Q. 1.
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from the statute.30 This view was later reversed, after further research made
the original error manifest and proved that chancery had jurisdiction over
charitable trusts independent of statutory authorization.31 The damage had
been done, however, for several states, either by statute or judicial decision,
determined that the Statute of Elizabeth was not in effect in those states and
that therefore charitable trusts were to be treated the same as private trusts.,"
Some states from the first recognized charitable trusts pursuant to their in-
herent jurisdiction.33 Other states have only recognized such trusts after
statutory authorization, which in some jurisdictions consists only of a partial
recognition, since beneficiaries of such trusts must be reasonably certain.-4
But today charitable trusts are recognized, in at least limited form, in all the
states.3 5 The reluctance to give full recognition to the English principles of
charitable trusts appears to be due to a great extent to the stigma attached
to prerogative cy pres and the confusion as to the actual extent of this power. °
There has been equally little consistency among the states in accepting the
doctrine of cy pres. Since American courts of equity could exercise only that
jurisdiction inherent in chancery, it became axiomatic that equity could not
exercise prerogative cy pres, but generally could exercise judicial cy pres."
It was usually stated that prerogative cy pres, if it existed at all in America,
30. Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1 (U. S.
1819).
31. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127 (U. S. 1S44) ; Ouid v. Washington Hospital
for Foundlings, 95 U. S. 303 (1877).
32. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 322; Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 343.
Although charitable trusts were not recognized, gifts to charitable corporations were
upheld. See note 36 infra. In order to sustain gifts, therefore, the courts of such states
construed those gifts to charitable corporations for specific purposes to be, not trusts, but
absolute gifts. The practice, unnecessarily maintained after charitable trusts were recog-
nized, has led to much confusion. See Scowt, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 343.1 ; Blactawell,
supra note 29, at 1; Lincoln, A Question on Gifts to Charitable Corporations (1939) 25
VA. L. Rnv. 764. In a recent New York case an anomalous result was barely averted
when a charitable corporation attempted, by the use of this rule of construction that a
gift for specific purposes is an absolute gift, to achieve the results of a cy pres applica-
tion without satisfying the requirements. St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 231 N. Y.
115, 22 N. E. (2d) 305 (1939) ; see (1939) 23 Mrxi. L. R'm,. 670.
33. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 322.
34. Ibid. New York at first recognized charitable trusts without statutory assistance,
and then judicially repudiated them. Finally they were recognized by statute. See Saxe,
Our New York System of Charities (1937) 9 N. Y. SrAx BAR Ass',.- B. 74. See, also,
Howard, Charitable Trusts in Maryland (1937) 1 Ao. L. Rnv. 105.
35. See BoGErT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 322; Scow, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 343.3.
36. Spalding v. St. Joseph's Industrial School for Boys of the City of Louisville,
107 Ky. 382, 54 S. IV. 200 (1899); Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564, 43 P. (2d) 941
(1935) ; see Blackwell, supra note 29, at 15. Another important reason for non-recogni-
tion of charitable trusts was the belief in some states that the most desirable policy was
to limit charitable gifts to those made to charitable corporations which might b2 under
legislative supervision. See Blackwell, stpra note 29, at 1.
37. See ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 399.1.
1939]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
rested with the legislature.38 Since, at the time of its introduction, the
doctrine of cy pres was distrusted because of a few extreme prerogative dis-
positions, and since it was impossible to distinguish between judicial and
prerogative applications in England, state courts either recognized the doctrine
with narrow restrictions or refused to apply the doctrine at all. 30 Some states
did recognize judicial cy pres from the first; others vacillated; and others
employed the principle only after statutory authorization. 40 At present there
appear to be seven states that still do not recognize the doctrine. 41 In some
of these, however, the same principle exists in part under the guise of approxi-
mation.
42
If it were shown in the argument of a case that in England a similar situa-
tion could be saved only by prerogative cy pres, most American courts felt
they were thereby automatically compelled to deny cy pres disposition. This
historical approach to these cases was unfortunate, because obscurity of origin
precluded any accurate distinction between prerogative and judicial cy pres,
and the concededly conjectural distinction maintained in England was of no
importance there, yet of great import in this country. It was established that
equity had inherent jurisdiction over charitable trusts and, among its enforc-
ing weapons, was the doctrine of cy pres. This device, just as other legal
concepts, was subject to development in fitting contemporary needs. 43 Its
American application should have been governed by socially desirable results
rather than by historical distinctions no longer of importance. The judicial
38. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 56 (1889) ; Penny v. Croul, 76
Mich. 471, 480, 43 N. W. 649, 652 (1889) ; In re Lott's Will, 193 Wis. 409, 413, 214 N,
W. 391, 393 (1927). Contra: In re Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 613, 131 N. E.
31 (1921). Notwithstanding these statements it would appear that arbitrary legislative
change of the terms of established charitable trusts might be attacked as unconstitu-
tional. The matter should be left to the courts. See Scorr, op. cit. su pra note 4, at
§ 399.5.
39. See Comment (1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 310; (1921) 6 IowA L. BULL. 177.
40. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 433; ZOLLMANN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at
§§ 122-127. The desirable statute is one that expressly authorizes cy pres in all those situa-
tions where the prerogative argument otherwise might prevail. E.g., MINN. STAT. (Ma-
son, 1927) §§ 8090-1 to 3; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 113, X. Y. PEas. PROP,. LAW § 12;
WIS. STAT. (1937) § 231.11 (7). See Dwan, Minnesota's Statute of Charitable Trusts
(1930) 14 MIxN L. Rv. 587.
41. Alabama, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, and Tennessee. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 433.
42. Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1913); Noble v. First Nat. Bank,
183 So. 393 (Ala. 1938) ; Dunn v. Ellisor, 225 Ala. 15, 141 So. 700 (1932).
43. Although not usually called cy pres, there is a similar equitable principle whereby
deviation from the terms of a private trust is permitted when circumstances have so
changed as to render the effectuation of the trust's original purposes impracticable. This
doctrine has developed to meet current problems of trust administration and has not
been hampered by historical distinctions. See Brunswick, The Court Moves the Dead
Hand (1936) 15 CHi.-KENT REv. 24; Scott, Deviation From the Terms of a Trust
(1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 1025.
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concepts of charitable trusts and cy pres were being introduced into a social
environment differing from the scene of its original development, and they
should, therefore, have been accordingly modified.
44
Another source of confusion concerning the cy pres doctrine as it was
introduced to the American courts lies in the overemphasis placed upon the
effectuation of the donor's intent. It appears quite certain that the doctrine
did not originate solely as an intent-enforcing device. It has been suggested
that the actual origin of cy pres is to be found in the civil law.4"4
There are Roman cases wherein memorial gifts for specified purposes were,
when found illegal, applied to proper objectives in order that the memory of
the donor might be preserved.40 There seems to be as much emphasis upon
the social benefit to be derived from such gifts as on any desire to effectuate
the donor's intention. The rationale of these cases is that it would be unjust
for a gift destined for charitable ends to fall back to the heirs because of
some technical difficulty. This doctrine was apparently carried over into
English law during the fifteenth century.4 - The prevalent attitude at that
time was that charitable gifts were an expiation of sin and an assurance of
eternal happiness.48 Thus where it proved impossible to carry out a testator's
specific charitable bequest, it was believed that his eternal welfare should not
be jeopardized by having the gift fail, and that his soul could be embalmed
as well by applying his gift cy pres to another charity. The motivating force
here was thus not the effectuation of the testator's intent, but rather the
saving of his soul. The primary concern was to keep the sum in charitable
channels; whether it was properly administered thereafter was considered
relatively unimportant.49 Ioreover, the chancellors, who were ecclesiastics,
were interested not only in saving the donor's soul, but also in preserving
the property of the church, and in maintaining for church purposes any gifts
made to it.50 In origin, then, it would appear that cy pres was employed
chiefly with the aim of advancing purposes believed to be of great social
benefit. Gradually, however, this emphasis changed; judicial cy pres tended
44. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid
down in the reign of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since and the rule simply persists from imitation of
the past." Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. R.Ev. 457, 469.
45. See ZOLLxx, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 117; PERRy, op. cit. Supra note 17, at
§ 690; Bradway, Tendencies in the Application of the Cy Pres Doctrine (1931) 5 T:. .
L. Q. 489.
46. Justinian's Digest, lib. 33, tit. 2, line 16; lib. 58, tit. 3, line 6; lib. 50, tit. 8, line 2.
47. See PERRY, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 690.
48. See Willard, Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Pres (1S94) 8 HLxnv. L. Rv. 69.
49. See Bradxay, supra note 45, at 497. In attempting to save a donor's soul, chan-
cery was, of course, fulfilling the donor's unexpressed primary purpose, but the court was
not narrowly following his expressed intention as to the mode of disposition which xwas
in later years to become the judicial tendency.
50. See BOaERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 431; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HisTero
OF ENGLISi LAW (2d ed. 1923) 328; SELEEN, Disrosiioz or INThsT.%TEs' GooDs, c. III.
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more and more to become a rule of construction and solely an intent-enforcing
instrumentY1 This tendency was undoubtedly strengthened by the criticism
evoked by the application of prerogative cy pres in an allegedly arbitrary
manner in those few cases disposing of gifts to superstitious uses or mistaken
charitiesY2 At the time when the doctrine was first presented in American
courts, the new trend had grown so pronounced that it was easy to overlook
the fact that the doctrine had not always been solely an intent-enforcing one.5 3
Although systematic categorization of cy pres cases is impossible because
each case is so dependent upon its own particular facts, nevertheless the
frequent recurrence of generally similar factual situations calling for cy pres
application furnishes a means of classification whereby the problems peculiar
to each class of cases may be considered. The first group of cases consists
of those in which the donor has so worded his charitable bequest that purposes
and beneficiaries are indefinitely described. A typical situation is that in
which a testator bequeaths a portion of his estate to trustees to dispose of
for such charitable purposes as they in their discretion shall select.64 In most
states this is deemed a valid charitable trust which a court will enforce upon
petition by the trustee or attorney general. Strictly, there is no question
of cy pres here at all, for the court is merely enforcing the terms of a trust.
Frequently, however, the courts unnecessarily state that enforcement of such
trusts is done pursuant to the cy pres powers of the court.50 In those states
recognizing only a limited form of charitable trust, where the beneficiaries
must be designated with a degree of certainty, this trust would be invalid.57
51. See Kohn, The Doctrine of Cy Pres in England and America (1915) 21 CAsE
AND COMMENT 628.
52. See Attorney General v. Lady Downing, Wilm. 1, 32, 97' Eng. Rep. 1, 13 (Ch.
1767).
53. See ZOLLAMANN, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 140.
54. In some early wills a court was named trustee. it re Pearson's Estate, 113 Cal.
577, 45 Pac. 849 (1896); Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269, 12 N. E. 331 (1887).
55. Under statute: Mitchell v. Reeves, 123 Conn. 549, 196 At. 785 (1938); Rabino-
witz v. Wollman, 174 Md. 6, 197 At. 566 (1938); in re Durbrow's Estate, 245 N. Y.
469, 157 N. E. 747 (1927); Moore v. Downham, 166 Va. 77, 184 S. E. 199 (1936). Un-
der inherent equitable powers: Gill v. Attorney General, 197 Mass. 232, 83 N. E. 676
(1908) ; In re Creighton's Estate, 60 Neb. 796, 84 N. W. 273 (1900) ; Brown v. Coxson,
118 N. J. Eq. 114, 177 Atl. 551 (1935). But the course of decisions in these states has
not always been so. Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N. W. 955
(1896) ; Tilden v. Green, 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880 (1891) ; In re Shattue's Will, 193
N. Y. 446, 86 N. E. 455 (1908) (validating statute notwithstanding).
56. See In re Crespi's Will, 158 Misc. 383, 388, 285 N. Y. Supp. 780, 786 (Surf. Ct.
1936). Disposition of these cases should be governed solely by the extent of a jurisdic-
tion's recognition of charitable trusts. See note 34, supra.
57. Hedin v. Westdala Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 81 P. (2d) 741 (1938);
Bush's Ex'er v. MacKoy, 267 Ky. 614, 103 S. W. (2d) 95 (1937); Davis v. Bullington,
164 Tenn. 272, 47 S. W. (2d) 555 (1932) ; Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564, 48 P. (2d)
941 (1935). North Carolina, notwithstanding a broad validating statute, still refuses to
sustain such indefinite charitable trusts. Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co.,
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An anomalous result is thus reached, because, in the final analysis, this
attitude results from fear of the reputedly arbitrary prerogative cy pres
power.58 Yet in England such trusts have been regularly upheld and applied
cy pres by the courts, not the crown,9
'Where the trustees of such indefinite charitable trusts predecease the testator
or refuse to act or fail to dispose of all the fund, the question is raised whether
the gift lapses or whether it still may be enforced by. the aid of cy presFP
This situation was unnecessarily confused by an early decision of the Supreme
Court, wherein the argument prevailed that upon the death of the designated
trustees, the trust was just like a gift to charity generally without trustees
interposed, and, therefore, a case which only prerogative cy pres could save.0 '
This unfortunate decision, which has had some following, was countered by
a decision of Mr. justice Holmes, which has now become one of the out-
standing opinions in tis field of the law.0 2 Therein it was shown that although
before 1803 some English cases regarded such a situation as falling within
prerogative cy pres,63 the English authority was definitely established by
Moggridge v. Thackwell,64 directly in point, that in such a situation cy pres
disposition was by the court. The majority of American cases have followed
this decision and not allowed a trust to fail where the trustee dies, refuses
or fails to appoint.0 5 In this situation the cy pres argument may be completely
averted by basing the decision on the doctrine that equity will not allow a
214 N. C. 224, 199 S. E. 20 (1938); see (1939) 37 ficHi. L. REv. 1132; (1939) 6 U. oF
CnL L. REv. 332. In these jurisdictions a trust for the poor of a locality is generally
sufficiently certain. Thompson's Ex'r v. Brown, 116 Ky. 102, 75 S. WM 210 (1903);
Kentucky Christian Missionary Society v. Iforen, 267 Ky. 358, 102 S. W. (2d) 335
(1937).
58. Hedin v. WVestdala Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 81 P. (2d) 741 (1933):
Spalding v. St Joseph's Industrial School for Boys of the City of Louisville, 107 Ky. 3P,
54 S. W. 200 (1899).
59. Attorney General v. Earl of Lonsdale, 1 Sim. 105, 57 Eng. Rep. 518 (Chi. 1827);
litford v. Reynolds, 1 Phil. 185, 41 Eng. Rep. 602 (Ch. 1841); Nightingale V. Goaul-
burn, 5 Hare 484, 67 Eng. Rep. 1003 (Ch. 1847).
60. The same problem arises where the name of a trustee is left blank or where a
party having a power of appointment fails to exercise it. Welch v. Caldwell, 226 Ill.
488, 80 N. E. 1014 (1907); Hood v. Dorer, 107 Wis. 149, 82 N. A. 546 (1900).
61. Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369 (U. S. 1854).
62. Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N. E. 839 (18,q).
63. See note 18, supra.
64. 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (1803). See note 26, supra.
65. Pursuant to statute: Gifford v. First Nat. Bank of Menominee, 235 Mich. 5$,
280 N. IV. 108 (1938) (refusal of trustees); In re Kelley's Will, 138 Misc. 190, 245 %. Y.
Supp. 294 (Surr. Ct 1930) (trustee predeceased testator); In re Thompson's Estate,
282 Pa. 30, 127 Atl. 446 (1925) (trustee died before appointed charities). Pursuant to
inherent equitable powers: Dupont v. Pelletier, 120 Me. 114, 113 Ad. 11 (1921) (re-
fusal) ; Boston v. Doyle, 184 'Mass. 373, 68 N. E. 851 (1903) (municipal office of desig-
nated trustees ceased to exist). Contra: Rogers v. Rea, 98 Ohio St. 315, 120 N. E. S2.3
(1918) ; In re Chellew's Estate, 127 Wash. 3,2, 221 Pac. 3 (1923). See Be=r., op. cit.
supra note 4, at § 438; ZOLIANx, op. dt. supra note 2, at § 403.
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valid trust to fail for want of a proper trustee. 0 Solution of the problem then
is dependent upon a determination of whether, since the testator may have
relied on the individual trustee's personal discretion, the fiduciary's powers
survive the designated trustee, which is an issue peculiar to the facts of each
case. Although in some cases it has been found that the trustee's powers
were not intended to be exercised by a successor,"7 the social benefit to be
derived from continuing the charities has generally induced courts to adopt
a liberal attitude regarding survival of powers in this situation. 8
Another situation raising questions concerning cy pres exists where the
testator has not established a trust or designated a manner of selection, but
has made a direct bequest "to charity,"'0 9 "to some Catholic institution," 70
or to a "county school fund."' 71 Such gifts without words of trust are
subject to the objection that in England they were generally disposed of only
by prerogative cy pres. 72 They are usually the result of instruments drawn
by laymen. 73 Omission of words of trust is too technical a test upon which
to determine validity, and also too narrow a basis to delimit the jurisdiction
of equity.74 Nor should great weight be given another argument that has
been advanced to defeat such gifts, that at the death of the testator there
was no one in whom title might vest. 75 The readily manipulated concept of
title would never furnish a stumbling block for an agile court, for the gift
may vest in the executor as trustee or in a trustee appointed by the court.1 0
In gifts to charity generally in this country, a court will ordinarily imply a
trust although there is little indication thereof from the instrument creating
66. Dunn v. Morse, 109 Me. 254, 83 Atl. 795 (1912) ; In re Hunter's Estate, 279 Pa.
349, 123 Atl. 865 (1924).
67. Hall v. Harvey, 17 N. H. 82, 88 At. 97 (1913).
68. Dunn v. Morse, 109 Me. 254, 83 Atl. 795 (1912). See BoGErT, op. cit. supra
note 4, at § 328; ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§ 385, 397; (1925) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv.
322.
69. In re Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 Atl. 150 (1938).
70. Chelsea Nat. Bank v. Our Lady Star of the Sea, 105 N. J. Eq. 236, 147 Atl. 470
(1929).
71. Burrier v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885 (1936).
72. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1803); In re Smith,
[1932] 1 Ch. 153.
73. See note 80, infra.
74. See Scor, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2075.
75. Gaston County United Dry Forces, Inc. v. Wilkins, 211 N. C. 560, 191 S. E. 8
(1937) (to any organization formed to enforce prohibition laws of a county); In re
Hoffen's Estate, 70 Wis. 522, 36 N. W. 407 (1888).
76. This argument is usually raised in the type of case where a direct gift has been
made to a county school fund which either has no legal existence or does not exist in
fact; but it is generally overcome by the trust theory. Chapman v. Newell, 146 Iowa
415, 125 N. W. 324 (1910) ; Burrer v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 92 S. W. (2d) 885 (1936),
overruling, Robinson v. Crutcher, 277 Mo. 1, 209 S. W. 104 (1919); Elliott v. Quinn,
109 Neb. 5, 189 N. W. 173 (1922). Where, because of the termination of a donee in the
life of the donor, the doctrine of lapse is applicable because there is no recipient of title it
does not follow that cy pres application is precluded. See note 101, infra.
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the gift, and will either deem the executor trustee or appoint a trustee.7
By this technique the intricacies of cy pres may be avoided. 8 Another rationale
used by some courts is to sidestep the prerogative cy pres argument by declar-
ing that a direct gift to the poor of a locality is not a gift to charity generally.-
There have been very few cases involving gifts specifically "to charity," but
a recent Pennsylvania case, aided by statute, sustained such a gift.8s It is
to be hoped that such a conclusion would be reached even in the absence of
statute.
81
In these three types of cases there seems no sound reason for denying
validity. The social desirability of maintaining these donations in charitable
channels is conceded. The donor has shown his intent to devote the fund
to charitable purposes rather than to his heirs. This is more conclusively
evidenced in indefinite gifts, because there is no question of what the donor
intended if a specific charity were unable to receive the gift. To void the gift
and thus send the fund to the donor's heirs would violate his expressed
intention. With regard to administration, it would appear that such general
gifts are often more desirable socially than specific endowments, because they
can be allocated to worthy charities where there is the greatest need. Poten-
tial supervision of such distribution is afforded by the attorney general's
power to petition the court to enforce proper distribution.82 Hence American
77. In re De Mar's Estate, 20 Cal. App. (2d) 514, 67 P. (2d) 374 (1937) (to the
poor soldiers in certain hospital) ; Heuser v. Harris, 42 111. 425 (1867) (to the poor of a
county); Kiumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa 434, 121 N. W. 34 (1909) (to the por of a
foreign city); Bowman v. Domestic & Foreign Missionary Society of Protestant Eris-
copal Church, 182 N. Y. 494, 75 N. E. 535 (1905) (to domestic 'Missions); Its re Kav-
anaugh's Estate, 143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W. 672 (1910) (for masses). Contra: Massanetta
Springs Summer Bible Conference Encampment v. Keezell, 161 Va. 532, 171 S. E. 511
(1933) (to trustees of proposed industrial school); Chelsea Nat. Bank v. Our Lady
Star of the Sea, 105 N. J. Eq. 236, 147 At. 470 (1929) (Catholic institution).
78. But only a few courts have adopted this desirable course of basing decisions sus-
taining gifts in this type of case wholly on the trust theory without discussion of cy pres.
French v. Lawrence. 76 N. H. 234, 81 Atl. 705 (1911); Gallagher v. Venturini, 124 X. J.
Eq. 538, 3 A. (2d) 157 (1938).
79. Attorney General v. Goodell, 10 Mass. 538, b2 N. E. (162 (1102); State c.r rel.
Wardens of the Poor v. Gerard, 37 N. C. 210 (1842).
80. "The house 469 Linden St. Allentown. Pa., my home, now pending for settlement
my part sold-and given to Charity." In re Jordon's Estate, 17 Lehigh County L. J.
349, 350 (Orphan's Ct. 1936), aff'd, 329 Pa. 427, 197 At. 150 (1938). But see Boo1 v.
Vinson, 104 Ark. 439, 149 S. W. 524 (1912).
81. REST.iTEMExr. TRusTs (1935) § 397 (f).
82. In several states there is statutory authorization for this power of the Attorney
General, but the power exists even in the absence of statute. See Jacks~,n v. Phillips,
96 Mass. 539, 579 (1867) ; ZOLLIMANNI, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 613. But see Hedin v.
VNrestdala Lutheran Church, 59 Idaho 241, 81 P. (2d) 741 (1938). Yet actually prudding
the attorney general into action is difficult and his supervision is not strict but sporadic.
Commissions to supervise charity administration such as exist in England afford the de-
sirable solution to the problem. See Scott, op. dt. supra note 4, at § 391. But Uecause
persons having a special interest in charitable gifts as beneficiaries may sue to enforce
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courts are without any real justification if they refuse to enforce such gifts,
merely because in England bequests of that nature were within the prerogative
power of the crown.83
The second general class of cases consists of those in which the donor
makes a direct gift to a specific charitable institution which for some reason
can not receive the gift. One such situation exists with respect to direct gifts
to an unincorporated charitable association. This problem was also regret-
tably confused by an early Supreme Court case in which it was deemed that
only prerogative power could validate such gifts.8 4 Shortly thereafter this
position was modified by a decision that, where the will provided for the
creation of a corporation by the executor, the devise was effective even though
at the time of the death of the donor there was no donee capable of taking.85
This set the style for several statutory enactments which recognized indefinite
charitable gifts only if the will provided for the establishment of a corpora-
tion.86 The actual difficulty in these cases was the rule generally followed in
this country that an unincorporated association was incapable of taking direct
bequests because, being a changing body of individuals without a legal entity,
no one was capable of holding legal title.87 The old cases, therefore, held that
such bequests lapsed. 88 But the rigors of the rule have gradually been evaded
either by a trust rationale, 89 or by cy pres application of the gift.0 The gift
may be treated as a trust to carry out the purposes of the unincorporated
association. The court will then appoint a proper trustee pursuant to the
proper execution; and since the donor's heirs who are entitled to the fund upon failure
of the donor's purposes frequently attempt to terminate the gift, the courts are afforded
considerable opportunity for supervision. See Scorr, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 391; RE-
STATEmENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 391.
83. See (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 573.
84. Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 4 Wheat. 1 (U. S.
1819). The court was primarily confused by the extent of equity's jurisdiction over char-
itable trusts. See notes 30 and 31, supra. The argument that prerogative cy pres was
necessary to sustain this type of gift was groundless because in England direct gifts to
unincorporated charitable societies were valid. See ZOLLN.ANN, op. Cit. supra note 2, at
§ 363.
85. Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet, 99 (U. S. 1830).
86. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. (1924) Art. 93, § 337.
87. See Comment (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 813; (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 258.
88. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 88 Tenn. 637, 13 S. W. 590 (1890). See ZOLLMANN, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, at § 369.
89. Osgood v. Rogers, 186 Mass. 238, 71 N. E. 306 (1904) ; Harger v. Barrett, 319
Mo. 633, 5 S. W. (2d) 1100 (1928) ; In re Shand's Estate, 275 Pa. 77, 118 At. 623 (1922) ;
It re Gilchrist's Estate, 50 IWy. 153, 58 P. (2d) 431 (1936). In New York the courts
have had great difficulty circumventing prior cases voiding direct gifts to unincorporated
societies. Now, however, such gifts are upheld by implying a trust. In re Patterson's
Estate, 139 Misc. 872, 249 N. Y. Supp. 441 (Surr. Ct. 1931); In re Clendenin's Estate,
9 N. Y. S. (2d) 875 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
90. St. Peters Church v. Brown, 21 R. I. 367, 43 Atl. 642 (1899) ; Powers v. Home
For Aged Women, 58 R. I. 323, 192 Atl. 770 (1937).
[Vol. 49: 303
REVALUATION OF CY PRES
familiar equity principle that a valid trust will not be allowed to fail for
want of a proper trustee.91 Where the unincorporated association is a branch
of a corporation, the gift is often applied cy pres to the corporation in trust
for the purposes of its subsidiary society. 2 Where the cy pres doctrine is
recognized, there is no difficulty in sustaining these gifts, and the trust tech-
nique affords an opportunity to achieve a desirable result in those jurisdic-
tions where cy pres is not recognized.
A somewhat similar situation is presented when the donee cannot take a
charitable bequest at the death of the donor, either because the organization
never, existed, or terminated before donor's death, or renounced the proffered
donation.93 The gift must fail unless a court will apply it cy pres. In England
there was considerable confusion in such cases as to whether disposition cy pres
should be by the court or the crown. 4 In the majority of American states
this historical argument has not been influential, for the courts readily imply
a trust. A gift to a charitable corporation is generally deemed a gift in trust
to the corporation for the benefit of the corporate purposes. 5
Before cy pres may be applied in this situation, the prerequisite of finding
a general charitable intent must be satisfied. The usual statement of the
doctrine runs that, if from the instrument creating the gift and from extrinsic
evidence it can be shown that the donor had a general intention to benefit
charity, then the failure of the donor's specific intention to benefit some par-
ticular charity will not send the fund back to the donor's heirs, but the gift
will be applied cy pres to some charity approximating that designated by the
donor.9 6 When the doctrine was first introduced in this country, the English
91. ,here a trust is established for charitable purposes and an unincorporated asso-
ciation which has no legal capacity to take legal title is named trustee, the trust .ill not
fail for a court will appoint a proper trustee. Scorr, op. cit. mpra note 4, at § 3972.
92. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. New York Guild for Je%,ish Blind, 252 App.
Div. 493, 299 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't 1937).
93. The courts are generally very liberal in construing testamentary language where
an attempt has been made to designate a specific donee but the precise corporate name has
not been employed. Richards v. Church Home for Orphan and Destitute Children, 213
Mass. 502, 100 N. E. 631 (1913); In re Peterson's Estate, 202 Minn. 31, 277 N. W. 529
(1938).
94. The trust test made in Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (CI.
1803), was followed and direct gifts to charitable corporations which could not take were
disposed of by prerogative cy pres. Denyer v. Druce, Tamlyn 32, 48 Eng. Rep. 14 (Ch.
1829) ; Reeve v. Attorney General, 3 Hare 191, 67 Eng. Rep. 351 (Ch. 1343). But as
the distinction became merely one of form trusts were readily implied. See note 23, vstra.
95. In re Scrimger's Estate, 188 Cal. 158, 205 Pac. 65 (1922) ; Read v. Willard Hos-
pital, 215 Mass. 132, 102 N. E. 95 (1913) ; In re Peterson's Estate, 202 Minn. 31, 277 N.
KV. 529 (1938); In re Walter's Estate, 150 Misc. 512, 269 N. Y. Supp. 402 (Surr. Ct.
1934) ; see Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 397.2. Some states, principally as a result of
historical development of cy pres, refuse to imply trusts in this situation although cy pres
application is not thereby precluded. See note 32, supra.
96. See BoGrT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 436; Scow, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 359.
It is generally stated that cy pres may only be applied by the court and the trustee may
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courts had placed sole emphasis upon enforcing the dead hand. 7 A general
charitable intention was not readily discovered. It was generally held in
England that a bequest to an organization once existing, but terminated before
the donor's death, could not be applied cy pres because it manifested only
a specific intent to benefit that particular institution and negatived any possi-
bility of a general intent.0 8 But where a gift was made to an organization
that had never existed, a general intention was found and the gift applied
cy pres, because it appeared that the donor had so little interest in the par-
ticular organization that he was not aware of its non-existence.90 These
rules manifested not only the emphasis placed on intent, but indicated that
in England the doctrine of cy pres was tending to become merely a set of
rules of construction. Although these rules were adopted in early American
cases, 100 gradually a tendency became manifest to find a general intention
more readily. 1' 1 The present trend is toward deciding each case on its own
facts without observing rules of thumb regarding intent. 10 2
not deviate from the expressed purposes without court authority. See Scorr, op. cit. supra
note 4, at § 381. Yet in some cases courts have sanctioned deviations made without prior
judicial authorization. People ex rel Smith v. Braucher, 258 I11. 604, 101 N. E. 944
(1913) ; First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Board of Trustees of Racine College, 225 Wis. 34,
272 N. W. 464 (1937). But see Kerner v. Thompson, 293 Ill. App. 454, 13 N. E. (2d)
110 (1938).
97. See Bradway, supra note 45, at 404.
98. Comment (1901) 14 HARv. L. REv. 453; (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 90. Where tile
gift has once vested in the donee, there can be no lapse, and upon termination of donee
different principles govern disposition of the fund. See note 119, infra.
99. (1936) 50 HARV. L. RE'. 128. The absurdity of the distinction, which in Eng-
land is still maintained, is evidenced by a recent case wherein gifts were made to an or-
ganization never existing and to a corporation terminating in the testator's lifetime, It
was held that the former gift could be applied cy pres but the latter gift lapsed. In re
Harwood [1936] 1 Ch. 285. It seems doubtful if the testator's intent was any different
respecting one gift than the other. See (1937) 17 B. U. L. R. 763.
100. Merrill v. Hayden, 86 Me. 133, 29 At. 949 (1893) ; Teele v. Bishop of Derry,
168 Mass. 341, 47 N. E. 422 (1897); Bowden v. Brown, 200 Mass. 269, 86 N. E. 351
(1908). Where gifts have been given to foreign donees incapable of taking, the courts
have generally refused to find a general charitable intent due primarily, it would seem,
to the complexities of foreign administration. National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167
Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933) ; In re O'Hanlon's Estate, 147 Misc. 546, 264 N. Y. Supp.
251 (Surr. Ct. 1933). But such a gift was upheld in City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Arnold, 268 N. Y. 297, 197 N. E. 288 (1935).
101. Donee refused bequest: Richardson v. Mullery, 200 Mass. 247, 86 N. E. 319
(1908); In re Mear's Estate, 299 Pa. 217, 149 Ati. 157 (1930). Contra: Allen v. City
of Bellefontaine, 47 Ohio App. 359, 191 N. E. 896 (1934). Designated donee never exist-
ed: Goree v. Georgia Industrial Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S. E. 684 (1938). Donce Icr-
minated before donor's death: In re Peterson's Estate, 202 Minn. 31, 277 N. W, 529
(1938) ; In re Walter's Estate, 150 Misc. 512, 269 N. Y. Supp. 400 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ;
R. I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Williams, 50 R. I. 385, 148 At. 189 (1929). Contra: Murphy
v. McBride, 14 Del. Ch. 457, 130 Atl. 283 (1925); Garner v. Home Bank & Trust Co.,
171 Tenn. 652, 107 S. W. (2d) 223 (1937).
102. Another problem raised in these questions is who is to receive title upoin the
donor's death. See note 87, supra. Generally it has not impeded courts in sustaining
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The statement of the test for applying cy pres solely in terms of intent
- a result not only of the historical development of the doctrine but also
of the American philosophy prevailing at the time of the introduction of
cy pres, fostering private property and.individual ownership -tends to cloud
the ultimate factors to be considered in resolving the problem. The use of
the concepts of general and particular intention, therefore, can only be justified
as a judicial teclmique, if, in determining whether or not a general intent
may be gleaned from an attempted charitable gift, all of the underlying issues
are considered. It is generally the case that the contingency making impossible
effectuation of the donor's specific intent was unforeseen by the donor when
he created the gift.'03 The court, therefore, must hazard a guess as to what
the donor's intention would have been had he anticipated the subsequent
situation. 0 4  In some cases a testator, because of personal affiliations or
peculiar predilections, might want to benefit only the specific donee and, if
this became impossible of accomplishment, might wish to have the fund go
to his heirs or residuary legatees. Some indication of such a design is afforded
by provisions for reverter upon failure of the gifts,1°O the fact that there is
only one charitable bequest in the will,100 or the fact that the residue of the
testator's estate is left to private individuals.' 07 But if these indicia do not
exist, and, if the testator has either provided in some fashion in his will for
these gifts. But where a designated donee has consolidated vth another corporation
before the donor's death and thereby no longer legally exists, the argument has prevailed
that there is no recipient of title and thus the gift must lapse. Trustees of Presbyterian
Church of Laporte v. Katsianis, 78 Ind. App. 406, 134 N. E. 6S4 (1922 ) ; Ward v. Worth-
ington, 28 Ohio App. 325, 162 N. E. 714 (1928). The argument should have no more
success where the donee has consolidated than where it has actually ceased to operate,
and cy pres should be applied wherever a general charitable intent can be discovered.
Under such an analysis cy pres has been applied. In re McCully's Estate, 269 Pa. 1M,
112 Ad. 159 (1920).
103. "When a testator has a real intention, it is not once in a hundred times that he
fails to make his meaning clear." GRAY. THE NA.%TURE AND Sour~cEs or Tim LAw (1909)
§ 702. With regard to funds for charitable purposes made up of numerous small contri-
butions the concept of general intent is more fictional than when applied to testamentary
bequests because there is little to indicate with what intention the contribution was made.
Because the identity of the individual donors has generally been lost, with rare excep-
tion, the courts dispose of these funds cy pres when original purposes prove impossible
of fulfillment. Schell v. Leander Clark College, 10 F. (2d) 542 (N. D. Iowa 1926);
Richards v. Wilson, 185 Ind. 335, 112 N. E. 780 (1916) ; Kerner v. Thompson, 293 111.
App. 454, 13 N. E. (2d) 110 (1938); see (193S) 26 IlM. B. J. 385; (1933) 15 X. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 300.
104. See BoGrRT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 436; Scott, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 3592.
105. See note 111, infra.
106. it re O'Hanlon's Estate, 147 Misc. 546, 264 N. Y. Supp. 251 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
107. In re O'Hanlon's Estate, 147 Misc. 546,264 N. Y. Supp. 251 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
cf. In re Young Woman's Christian Ass'n of N. Y., 96 N. J. Eq. 568, 126 At. 610
(1924). Conversely a gift of residue to charity would generally be an indication that the
donor intended to bestow nothing more upon his heirs. See Citizens & Manufacturers
National Bank v. Guilbert, 121 Conn. 520, 526, 186 AtI. 564, 567 (1936).
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his heirs, thereby indicating that such gifts were all he intended to bestow
upon them, 10 8 or if it appears that he has no close relatives, 00 then it would
seem that he had no desire that the funds should ever be withdrawn from
charitable channels. This, in fact, would seem to be the actual attitude of
many testators." 0 It would appear to be common for a person to think of
himself when making such gifts as benefiting charity generally through the
services of a particular institution, and were he to be presented with future
circumstances making the exact effectuation of his expressed intent impossible,
he would doubtless desire to devote the fund to other charitable purposes.
Therefore, unless it can be shown with some definiteness that the testator
would have desired the gift to revert to his heirs upon failure, the social
benefits derived from such gifts should influence the courts to retain the fund
in charitable causes.
Some recent cases in actual results have indicated an acceptance of this
analysis, and moreover, have tended to limit the effect of provisions for
reverter."' Instructions that if the gift lapse or conditions are not fulfilled,
the fund is to fall into the residue of the estate or go to designated individuals
have not prevented findings of general intent where a corporate donee has
terminated after enjoying the gift for a time." 2 Nor have provisions that gifts
for certain purposes be used for "no other purposes" prevented findings of
general charitable intention where the donee ceases after receiving the gift.110
The narrowest construction placed upon a reverter provision is found in a
recent case in which lands were deeded to a city for a memorial library on
108. See Fisher v. Minshall, 102 Colo. 154, 157, 78 P. (2d) 363, 364 (1938) ; Bruce v.
Maxwell, 311 Ill. 479, 488, 143 N. E. 82, 86 (1924).
109. Thatcher v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S. W. (2d) 677 (1934). A further indica-
tion of a general charitable intent is afforded where practically the whole estate is given
to charity. In re Mill's Estate, 121 Misc. 147, 200 N. Y. Supp. 701 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
110. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1308.
111. Provisions that a charitable trust is to terminate upon a certain contingency are
valid, and upon the happening of the contingency the fund reverts to the donor's heirs,
Where there is a gift over to designated individuals, not the donor's heirs, and the
contingency will not of necessity occur within the time set by the rule against per-
petuities, the gift over is void. The dilemma is thus presented of maintaining the fund
in charitable channels by cy pres or giving the fund to the donor's heirs who were not
the intended recipients. See ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§ 401-401.8. This predica-
ment is usually resolved in favor of a charitable application. Hartford Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Oak Bluffs First Baptist Church, 116 Conn. 347, 164 Ati. 910 (1933);
Grimke v. Malone, 206 Mass. 49, 91 N. E. 899 (1910); In re Gary's Estate, 248 App.
Div. 373, 288 N. Y. Supp. 382 (1st Dep't 1936).
112. In re Young Women's Christian Ass'n of N. Y., 96 N. J. Eq. 568, 126 Ati. 610
(1924); Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921). Contra:
First Congregational Society of Bridgeport v. Bridgeport, 99 Conn. 22, 121 Atl. 77
(1923) ; In re Fletcher's Estate, 280 N. Y. 86, 19 N. E. (2d) 794 (1939). See (1922) 35
HARv. L. REv. 477.
113. In "e Harrington's Will, 243 App. Div. 235, 276 N. Y. Supp. 868 (4th Dep't
1935) ; Graff v. Harrington, 137 Misc. 712, 244 N. Y. Supp. 307 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
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condition that if ever used for other purposes the land was to revert to the
grantor or his heirs. When the state took the land from the city by eminent
domain for an annex to the state capitol building, the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court held that the condition applied only to action by the city, that
the reverter clause was not rendered operative, and that the city could apply
the funds received from the state to effectuate the donor's desire to furnish
library facilities.1 14 The results in these cases, insofar as they manifest a
swing away from the overemphasis formerly placed upon effectuating charit-
able intent and toward a greater recognition of the interests of society in
maintaining these funds in charitable courses, is highly desirable.1 5
In this situation some courts have not used the cy pres doctrine, but the
trust technique. This may be advantageous in either of two situations. In
the first place, this theory may prove practically desirable when in a lower
court the gift to a terminated corporation is deemed to lapse, but on appeal
it is desired to apply the gift to another corporate donee. Where there is
only one possible recipient for this gift, the appellate court, by deeming the
gift a charitable trust lacking a trustee, may appoint the one available organ-
ization trustee and thereby avert the expense of referring the case to a lower
court for approval of a scheme for cy pres disposition. 10 In the second
place, this trust theory is doctrinally advantageous, for in this way a court
can achieve a desirable result without threading its way through the com-
plexities of cy pres.1 7 It is to be hoped that this technique will be more
frequently resorted to in those states professing not to recognize cy pres.' 8
The final class of cy pres cases is composed of those in which the donor has
failed to account for changing circumstances with the result that the par-
ticular mode of effectuating his gift has become impracticable or impossible.110
114. State v. Federal Square Corporation, 3 A. (2d) 109 (N. H. 1939) ; see (1939)
7 Dunc B. A. J. 137.
115. See Bradway, supra note 45, at 497.
116. Read v. Willard Hospital, 215 Mass. 132, 102 N. E. 95 (1913 1 ; cf. Richards v.
Church Home for Orphans & Destitute Children, 213 Mass. 502, 100 X. E. 631 (1913).
117. v'ood v. Hartigan, 195 Ad. 507 (R. I. 1937). The same theory has hten em-
ployed where the donee terminates after receiving the gift. Hobbs v. Beard of Education
of Northern Baptist Convention, 126 Neb. 416, 253 N. AN. 627 (1934).
118. It is in such jurisdictions that the most unfortunate results in this situation are
to be found. Where a testator, admittedly with a general intent to further education,
bequeathed a fund to a college which terminated before his death, the gift was held to
lapse. Garner v. Home Bank & Trust Co., 171 Tenn. 652, 107 S. W. (2d) 223 (1937). A
residuary gift was held to fail when made to an organization aiding orphans because its
corporate charter expired before the death of the testator even though it was reincorpor-
ated under a slightly different name in the year of the testator's death. Murphy v. Mc-
Bride, 14 Del. Ch. 457, 130 Aft. 283 (1925).
119. There are inumerable ways by which the accomplishment of the donor's pur-
poses may be thwarted. Where the donee after receiving the gift terminates or consoli-
dates with a similar organization, the courts generally discover a general charitable
intent and apply cy pres. State ex re. Attorney General v. 'Van Buren School District,
191 Ark. 1096, 89 S. W. (2d) 605 (1936) ; In re Mills' Estate, 156 Misc. 473, 2 2 N. Y.
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In this group of cases there is no question of prerogative cy pres, for it has
always been recognized that cy pres disposition in these situations was made
by the court. 2 0 As in the case where the donee is unable to receive the gift
at the death of the donor, the label of general charitable intent must be
applied before the magic of cy pres may be invoked. 12 1 Moreover, it is neces-
sary to show that the original specific intent is to some degree impossible of
accomplishn.ent. Since the doctrine as originally adopted in this country was
deemed only an intent-enforcing device, it was frequently stated that the
court could never modify the donor's intent "upon considerations of policy
or convenience. ' ' 22 Therefore, it was necessary to establish almost complete
impossibility. 23  Gradually, however, the factor of public welfare became a
more important element in these cases and it became less difficult to establish
impossibility or impracticability of applying the gift as designated.' 2"
Supp. 25 (Surr. Ct. 1935). Where the purpose for which a gift was made has been
accomplished by legislation, cy pres is generally applied. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass.
539 (1867). Contra: Women's Christian Temperance Union of El Paso v. Cooley, 25
S. W. (2d) 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). Where the funds available for a charitable be-
quest are insufficient to carry out the designated purposes, a general charitable intent is
found and whatever funds there are applied cy pres. Citizens & Manufacturers Nat. Bank
v. Guilbert, 121 Conn. 520, 186 Atl. 564 (1936); Patton v. Pierce, 114 N. J. Eq. 548,
169 Atl. 284 (1933). Contra: Fisher v. Minshall, 102 Colo. 154, 78 P. (2d) 363 (1938).
See Comment (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 514; (1937) 35 MIcu. L. Rlv. 694.
120. See ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 399.1. Another form of impossibility is
illegality of the donor's specific purpose. As long as there exists a general charitable
intent, the fund will be applied cy pres. Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N. E.
1008 (1905) (corporate donee legally incapable of receiving further capital). These
cases are clearly different from those where the donor's primary purpose is illegal and,
in England, were disposed of by prerogative cy pres. In this country when the principal
purpose of a gift violates a statute or public policy it is voided and there is no question
of cy pres disposition. Bowditch v. Attorney General, 241 Mass. 168, 134 N. E. 796
(1922).
121. See Scorr, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 399.2.
122. See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 592. (1867) ; Peter E. Leddy Post No. 19
of American Legion v. Roberts, 99 N. J. Eq. 217, 222, 129 Atl. 148, 151 (1925). The
extreme to which the English courts went in denying departure from donor's expressed
desires was manifested by cases in the eighteenth century refusing to permit the exten-
sion of the curriculum of schools established by testators for the instruction of Latin and
Greek. See ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 399.4.
123. A fund given a university for scientific courses could not be devoted to a school
to be operated jointly by that university and another, even though it was the most efficient
mode of using the fund, because it was not impossible to effectuate the settlor's intent.
President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Attorney General, 228 Mass. 396, 117 N. E.
903 (1917).
124. Cases are so dependent upon their particular facts in this situation that only rough
classification of the prevailing judicial attitude is feasible. Cy pres applied: Reasoner v.
Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N. E. 276 (1922); Hodge v. Wellman, 191 Iowa 877, 179 N.
W. 534 (1920) ; In Matter of St. John's Church of Mt. Morris, 263 N. Y. 638, 189 N. E.
734 (1934) ; In re Curran's Estate, 310 Pa. 434, 165 Atl. 842 (1933). Cy pres denied:
President & Fellows of Harvard College v. Jewett, 11 F. (2d) 119 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925);
Atkinson v. Lyle, 191 Ark. 61, 85 S. W. (2d) 715 (1935).
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The question in this situation where circumstances have changed is really
how long the donor's intention will be required to be carried out exactly as
specified before it will be labelled impossible of accomplislunent, and the use
of the gift modified. The interests of the heirs or residuary legatees of the
donor are not involved directly in this analysis, for after it is determined that
the specific mode of effectuating the donor's intent has become impossible,
before cy pres may be applied, a general charitable intent or a manifestation
that the funds should not be withdrawn from charitable purposes must be
established, just as in the situation where a donee is unable to receive the
bequest.125 The issue, then, seems to be whether maximum social benefit from
the fund or the exact effectuation of the donor's intent should be the criterion
of the court.120 Just as the donor probably never anticipated that a specific
donee would be unable to receive a gift, so also is it quite apparent that the
donor never foresaw the possibility of changed circumstances. Had he had
any intent on the subject it probably would have been expressed. Even if
it appears that the donor had to some extent provided for future changes,
he could not possibly account for all eventualities. The process of the court,
then, is again one not of construing, but of constructing intent. In view of
the underlying policy of the law favoring charities, because of the social
benefit accruing therefrom, where the donor has failed to provide for the
contingency of changed circumstances affecting his bequest, the court should
consider the donor a reasonable man conversant with the means of employing
funds for the most beneficial charitable purposes, and, therefore, one who,
when faced with the contingency, would have devoted the fund to such
purposes.' 2 7
The requirements necessary before the labels "impossible" or "impracti-
cable" will be applied to tag a fund for cy pres application have been relaxed,
and disposition made with a greater emphasis on public benefits. Where a
testatrix left the residue of her estate to a state commission of sculpture to
erect a memorial appropriate to her father's memory - suggesting a fountain
-and the residue exceeded original expectations, the court held that the
inability of the commission to approve a plan indicated a sufficient reason
for using the fund to build a city library.'28 Another example is furnished
in a case where a Catholic priest created a trust to be continued until the
funds could be paid over to a parochial school to be built in his town. When
twenty years after his death no school had been erected, it was held that the
money could be applied cy pres to the purposes of the church under whose
auspices the school was to be built, since the ideal situation of inter-denomi-
125. See p. 315 et seq., supra.
126. See Scotr, op. cit. supra note 4, at 2116.
127. See Bradway, supra note 45, at 526; Scott, Education and the Dead Hand (1920)
34 HAxv. L. REv. 1.
128. Seymour v. Attorney General, 124 Conn. 490, 200 At!. 815 (1933); ef. In re
Chucovich's Estate, 103 Colo. 104, 83 P. (2d) 323 (193S).
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national harmony existed in the town, and any sectarian school might do
more harm than good.129 These cases manifest the highly desirable trend of
the courts toward disregarding the specific fulfillment of the donor's design
in favor of the interests of public welfare. 130 In determining the requirements
to establish impossibility, the criterion should be the utilization of the gift
for the greatest social benefit.' 8'
In the treatment of all these problems relating to charitable gifts, the courts
have been impeded in attaining the most desirable solutions by two factors:
the fear that in sustaining a gift or applying cy pres the court was assuming
prerogative power; and the fear of violating early definitions of the doctrine
which dictated that the donor's intent must prevail to the exclusion of policy
considerations. It now appears that the basis of these restraining contentions
are unsound and early errors have been partially rectified. But the law in
this field is not yet ideal. First, it is to be hoped that those states recognizing
charitable trusts in limited form only and those states refusing altogether to
recognize the cy pres doctrine will, if not by judicial decision, then by
statute, follow the lead of the majority. Secondly, it is highly desirable that
the argument against cy pres disposition on the ground that it is an exercise
of prerogative power be forever buried. Third, it seems of utmost importance
that the courts in reaching results which obviously show the impact of social
considerations should not continue to couch their decisions in the outmoded
terminology of the eighteenth century.'8 2
129. In re Dean's Estate, 167 Misc. 238, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 711 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
130. This change of emphasis is interestingly brought out by two cases considering
the same charitable trust. In 1851 a testator established a trust to furnish relief to all
poor immigrants and travelers coming into St. Louis on their way to settle in the west.
The number of persons fitting the testator's description were so few by 1924 and there
were so many poor travelers in St. Louis that an attempt to have the fund applied cy
pres was made. It was held, however, that the testator's inteit could still be carried out
at least to some extent, and cy pres was denied. St. Louis v. McAllister, 281 Mo. 26,
218 S. W. 312 (1920). But a second application in 1934 met with success although con-
ditions since 1920 were little changed and it was held that the testator's purpose had now
become impractical and the fund could be applied cy pres to help all travelers in the city
regardless of direction. Thatcher v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S. W. (2d) 677 (1934).
See (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 467.
131. New York appears to have taken a very liberal attitude. Where a testatrix be-
queathed a house to a village to be used for a hospital, the village applied for cy pres
application to allow erection on the premises of an administration building on the theory
that the village was not financially able to maintain a hospital and that a neighboring
hospital satisfied the community's needs. The lower courts denied cy pres disposition be-
cause the testamentary intention had not become impractical, but the Court of Appeals,
initiating a more liberal policy, reversed and allowed the proposed disposition. Its re
Neher's Will, 279 N. Y. 370, 18 N. E. (2d) 625 (1939).
132. E.g., Thatcher v. Lewis, 335 Mo. 1130, 76 S. W. (2d) 677 (1934) ; State v. Fed-
eral Square Corporation, 3 A. (2d) 109 (N. H. 1938); In re Neher's Will, 279 N. Y.
370, 18 N. E. (2d) 625 (1939).
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In deciding whether a particular gift manifests a general charitable intent
and whether it has become impossible or impracticable to effectuate a donor's
specific intent, the determining factors should be expressly recognized.13
-Even where the most desirable results are achieved, it seems unfortunate
that the language employed is so unrealistic. Maintaining the terminology
of intent without expressly recognizing the element of public welfare gives
the impression of judicial hypocrisy and assures an increasing confusion.
Only when all courts recognize these three impediments in the present status
of cy press development, will the doctrine begin to realize its manifest poten-
tialities for social benefit.
133. .g., Seymour v. Attorney General, 124 Conn. 490, 200 Ad. 815 (1933); In re
Dean's Estate, 167 Misc. 233, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 711 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
